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ABSTRACT  
 
The  tumble  mode  is  a  pitching  departure  from  controlled  flight  which  leads  to  a  pitch 
autorotation  that  is  generally  unrecoverable  –  resulting  in  vertical  ground  impact,  usually 
preceded by in-flight breakup (the mechanism for which, surprisingly, can sometimes prevent 
loss of life).  This was identified in work led by the British Microlight Aircraft Association 
beginning in 1997 as a response to a number of fatal accidents in Rogallo winged microlight 
aeroplanes, although the tumble is also known to occur to hang-gliders. 
 
This paper explains how this class of aeroplane is controlled, and how it has been found that 
they can enter the tumble mode. 
 
The mechanism by which the tumble can be entered is described.  This has led to work 
showing how flight testing can be used to establish and demonstrate resistance to tumble 
entry – particularly important with increasing number of very high performance flexwings.  
These flight tests will be explained, together with the significance of the results. 
 
Recent  accident  investigation  work  has  also  shown  a  new  mechanism  of  tumble  entry, 
through  partial  failure  of  the  A-frame  structure  and  the  pitch-trimmer  mechanism.  Also 
described is a possible relevance to well known historical accidents to flying wing aeroplanes 
– specifically the YB-49 and dH-108, and discovered data on the characteristics of the BKB-1 
flying wing glider; are also described. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The tumble mode is a departure from controlled flight which was first studied rigorously by 
the British Microlight Aircraft Association (BMAA) following a fatal accident to fatal accident to 
Gemini  Flash  IIa  aircraft  G-MVEP[1].    Conclusions  were  reached  concerning  this  mode 
[2],[3], which  may be summarised by: 
 
•  The mode is a nose-down pitching departure from controlled flight, leading to a pitch 
autorotation at rates up to 400° /s. 
•  No pre-breakup ‘escape route’ from an established tumble mode has been identified. 
•  The tumble invariably leads to loss of the aircraft, and in a large proportion of cases 
[usually those where the monopole failed during in-flight breakup] loss of the crew also. 
 
Four potential entry routes were identified, which were: 
•  The whip-stall; 
•  Spiral instability combined with loss of visual horizon; 
•  Failed loop (or other aerobatic) manoeuvre; 
•  Flight through (own) wake vortex. 
 
That  work  also  led  to  training  material  being  published  which  has  been  used  to  actively 
advise microlight pilots regarding tumble avoidance [4], [5].  This advice has been repeated 
elsewhere for the education of both microlight and hang-glider pilots, e.g. [6, 7, 8, 9]. 
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During the 4 years since that published advice, the UK has seen a single tumble microlight 
accident, with the loss of two lives [10].  It is highly unlikely that this particular accident would 
have been prevented by adherence to published avoidance advice, since the accident report 
concluded that the causal event was an in-flight structural failure (which nonetheless has 
interesting handling-qualities implications and will be discussed later).  However despite this 
apparent success in accident reduction caused by publishing training and operational advice, 
work has continued aimed firstly at understanding the nature of the tumble mode itself, and 
secondly  (and  far  more  importantly)  aiming  to  establish  the  flight  test  and  certification 
requirements that will achieve an aeroplane which, even if operated significantly outside of 
the permitted envelope, will be as resistant as possible to tumble entry. 
 
Finally, some historical investigations have been conducted which indicate that the tumble 
mode  is  not  in-fact  restricted  to  Rogallo  winged  aircraft  (that  is, flexwing  microlights  and 
hang-gliders)  and  may  historically  have  occurred  in  several  prototype  rigid  ‘flying  wing’ 
aeroplanes: specifically the Northrop YB-49 and XP-79,  the de-Havilland dH-108 and the 
BKB-1 tailless glider.  This may increase the importance of this work, since interest in flying 
wings has never ceased (indeed the B-2 Stealth, a flying-wing is now the mainstay of the 
USAF long-range bombing fleet), and the tumble characteristics may yet repeat in future rigid 
flying-wings.  
 
 
PRIMARY CONTROL OF ROGALLO WINGED AEROPLANES 
 
Readers unfamiliar with the general design of weightshift (Rogallo winged) microlights are 
referred to reference [11]; however, it is useful to remind the reader of the method of control 
of a weighshift controlled aeroplanes.  Considering Figure 1 below,  weightshift microlight 
consists of two parts – the wing (including flying wires and control frame) A, and the trike B: 
these are linked by a hangpoint C which is a joint allowing free rotation of the wing and trike 
relative to each other in pitch and roll. 
 
Figure 1, P&M Quik GT450 front view 
 
 
In straight and level flight, the trike hangs below the wing, with forces upon the whole aircraft, 
and moments acting within each of the wing and trike, about the hangpoint, as well as total 
aircraft moments about the CG being in balance.   
 
Thrust control is via the throttle in the conventional manner, although the aeroplane has two 
throttle controls – a normal hand-throttle  (most commonly adjacent to the pilot’s left hand), 
and a sprung foot-throttle on the pilot’s right pedal similar in operation to the accelerator 
(gas) pedal in a car.  In the cruise it is normal to set power using the hand-throttle, but the 
foot-throttle may always increase power above that which provides a minimum power setting.   
 
A 
B 
C   3 
Pitch control is via the control bar (the lower part of the triangular frame in front of the pilot).  
In order to pitch nose-down, the pilot must pull the bar towards him, applying a direct nose-
down pitching moment to the wing.  Conversely, to pitch nose-up, the pilot must push the bar 
forwards,  applying  a  direct  nose-up  pitching  moment  to  the  wing.    From  the  pilot’s 
perspective, these are the opposite to those in a conventional aeroplane. 
 
For roll control, in order to initiate a turn to the right, the control bar should be pushed to the 
left.  Initially this applies a direct rolling moment to the wing; however, once a turn has been 
initiated, two factors then amplify this turn so that only relatively small pilot input forces are 
required.  Firstly via a flexible surface amplified by lufflines running through the top of the 
kingpost (both are visible at the top of Figure 1) the trailing edge of the downgoing wing will 
tend to travel upwards and the trailing edge of the upgoing wing will tend to travel downwards 
– thus creating an aileron effect known as billow shift.  Secondly, the vertical CG will have 
displaced to one side, of the lift vector, so that that lift force is now acting about (rather than 
through) the lateral CG position, creating a net rolling moment. The result is roll authority 
capable typically between 2.5 - 5.0 seconds from 30° -30°  without exceptional piloting effort., 
although as with pitch control the pilot’s perception is that the control operates in reverse to 
the primary controls of a conventional aeroplane. 
 
 
 
DESCRIBING THE ENTRY MECHANISMS 
 
The Whip Stall 
The  whip-stall  is  an  aggressive  entry  to  the  aerodynamic  stall  (pushing  the  bar  out 
aggressively  to  achieve  a  high  deceleration  rate,  well  in  excess  of  the  1kn/s  normally 
recommended), followed by an equally aggressive recovery initiation by the pilot (pulling in 
the control bar rapidly).  This is a manoeuvre which may be used during flight testing (with 
great  care)  to  demonstrate  VNE  or  VDF  [12],  which  are  otherwise  usually  control  limited.  
However, there is absolutely no need for a pilot, other than a test pilot in the course of their 
duties,  to  ever  carry  out  this  manoeuvre  in  normal  flight;  the  whip-stall  is  specifically 
prohibited by all microlight manufacturers, and by the UK pilot training syllabus[13].  It is 
considered  likely  (and  several  eyewitness  reports  of  fatal  accidents  bear  this  out  -  most 
recently the October 2000 fatality to a Pegasus Quantum [14]) that this mechanism can lead 
to the tumble. 
 
The sequence of actions in the whip stall is detailed below. 
•  The pilot places the aircraft in a climbing attitude, and pushes the control bar out rapidly 
to achieve a high deceleration rate.  At the steepest possible nose-up attitude, the throttle 
is closed. 
•  The airspeed decreases rapidly, with nose-up rotational inertia pitching the aircraft nose-
up past the normal AoA than would normally be expected for the stall, associated loss of 
airspeed will also occur.  As a consequence, the aircraft will reach a state where the AoA 
is greater and the airspeed lower than would normally be expected at the stall.  This 
point, when the maximum nose-up attitude is reached is the stall as perceived by the 
pilot. 
•  At  the  point  of  stall, the  wings  aerodynamic  pitching  moment  becomes  strongly  nose 
down.  Due to the low airspeed, this is likely to be less than if the stalling angle of attack 
is reached in a less dynamic manoeuvre. 
•  The trike, which had been held in a steep nose-up attitude by thrust, pitches down and 
pushes against the wing (front strut against basebar) creating a rigid system upon which 
a net nose-down pitching moment is acting. 
•  The aircraft is then rotating nose-downwards, with the entire system rotating about the 
whole aircraft CG (rather than the wing alone rotating about the hangpoint).  This can 
initiate the tumble, as previously discussed. 
 
   4 
Spiral Instability 
Weightshift microlight aircraft are normally approved only for flight in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions (VMC).  This implies a guaranteed visual horizon which the pilot may use as a 
reference when correcting small rolling departures.  However, it is possible through ill-luck or 
poor  judgement  for  an  aircraft  to  enter  conditions  where  a  defined  horizon  cannot  be 
guaranteed (most commonly by entering cloud).  If this happens, any pilot should attempt to 
remove the aircraft from this condition as quickly as possible; however, if the pilot is unable 
to extract themselves from this situation it is almost inevitable that some cause (most likely 
the turbulence commonly found inside or near to most clouds) will initiate an undemanded 
rolling  manoeuvre.    Unlike  most  conventional  fixed  wing  aeroplanes,  many  weightshift 
microlight aircraft are spirally unstable (particularly at higher power settings); thus, an initial 
small bank angle is likely to increase without (unless a horizon reference is available) the 
pilot’s knowledge or ability to control it.  The aircraft would then enter a divergent rolling 
manoeuvre, potentially through 90°  of bank to a condition where the pendulum stability which 
keeps the trike below the wing will cease to act, and the wing angle of attack will reverse 
sense – inevitably causing some loss of control.  Some tumble accidents, for example that to 
G-MVEP  [1]  have  occurred  in  conditions  where  the  horizon  was  known  to  be  poor,  and 
where  the  subsequent damage  to  the  aircraft showed  that  the  basebar  had fractured  (in 
contact with the front strut) at the end.  
 
Failed Loop 
Whilst weightshift microlight aircraft are neither approved, nor should be, for aerobatics, it is 
occasionally known for a pilot to attempt aerobatic manoeuvres.  There are several reported 
instances of pilots attempting to conduct a loop in a weightshift microlight.  If positive normal 
acceleration is maintained throughout this manoeuvre then it can be executed as safely as in 
any other aeroplane.  However, as with any other aircraft, if the aircraft runs out of kinetic 
energy  near  to  the  top  of  the  loop,  then  the  pilot  will  find  themselves  inverted  without 
sufficient airspeed to complete the manoeuvre.  In this case, the inevitable consequence will 
be a negative angle of attack, potentially leading to a tumble.  A time-frame analysis of such 
a failed loop leading to an unrecoverable tumble is shown in references [2, 3, 4]. 
 
Flight through (own) wake vortex 
It is well known that a minimum safe separation should be ensured between landing aircraft, 
particularly behind larger aircraft which tend to generate very large vortex wakes that can 
normally be expected to remain for up to 80 seconds [15, 16] in normal conditions, rather 
longer in very still air. The weightshift microlight using, as it does, a delta wing tends to 
generate a particularly large wake vortex for the size of the aircraft capable of generating 
considerable upset [17].  For this reason, pilots of weightshift aircraft are taught that level 
turns  should  never  be  continued  beyond  270°  and  preferably  not  beyond  180°   without 
climbing or descending during the turn. 
 
Considering a typical turning manoeuvre at 45 kn CAS, 60°  bank, 2000ft the turn rate will be 
40° /s.  Hence, if the pilot were to fly a continuous tight balanced turn, the aircraft’s own wake 
vortex would be met in less than 9 seconds - scarcely time for the vortex to have significantly 
dispersed in even moderately disturbed airflow.  It is known that aircraft flying through the 
wake vortex of another can suffer a large magnitude undemanded roll.  It is then reasonable 
to assume that the same mechanism, as was described above, for a loss of visual horizon 
may also occur – although it is likely that the onset will be more rapid. 
 
The fatal accident to G-MVDO in 1992 was considered by the AAIB investigation report [18] 
to have been a tumble and in-flight break-up following a pilot flying what were observed from 
the ground to have been extremely tight turns of 360°  or more.   
 
 
THE FATAL ACCIDENT TO G-STYX: A NEW TUMBLE ENTRY MECHANISM 
 
Reference [10] describes a fatal accident to a Pegasus Quik aircraft, which is the fastest of 
the latest generation of high performance flexwings – boasting a maximum cruise speed in 
excess  of  90  knots  (compared  to  around  65  knots  for  previous  generation  such  as  the   5 
Pegasus Quantum or Mainair Blade), together with MAUW climb rates around 1200fpm [19].  
At the time of the accident, the aeroplane was engaged in an instructional flight when it 
entered a tumble autorotation, leading to separation of wing and trike.  A similar aircraft is 
shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2, Pegasus Quik  
 
 
 
Description of the accident causes 
The AAIB report into the accident to G-STYX concluded that the initiating event was a partial 
structural failure of the upper joint of the starboard control frame upright (indicated by A in 
Figure  2  above).    A  maintenance  error  cause  the  joint,  which  is  normally  loaded  in 
compression, to buckle.  In itself, this would be serious but unlikely to cause rapid loss of the 
aircraft; however, on this particular aircraft (in common with many flexwing microlights of the 
same  or  previous  generation),  the  pitch  trim  mechanism  consists  of  a  tensioning  device 
pulling upon the lufflines at B.  This in turn is linked to a trim control on the starboard upright 
at C, via a cable which passes through the upright and its top joint.  When the top joint failed, 
this  suddenly  shortened  the  pitch  trimmer  cable,  tensioning  the  lufflines  and  creating 
(combined with what on-board data recording showed to be high speed / full power flight) a 
sudden nose-up control input.  It is believed that once the aircraft had pitched steeply nose-
up, the pilot rapidly closed the throttle, leading to a whipstall as described above. 
 
The  safety  lessons  to  be  learned  from  this  are  complex,  concentrating  primarily  upon 
maintenance control.  However, it has emphasised to the microlight flight test community the 
importance of considering the flight test and handling-qualities implications of systems failure 
– it is possible that different handling qualities could have resulted in an aircraft that did not 
suffer a whip-stall and resultant tumble, notwithstanding that the cause of the accident was 
an unforeseen (and largely unforeseeable) structural failure. 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE AERODYNAMICS OF THE TUMBLE 
 
Research has also been carried out to investigate the flow around a tumbling aircraft [20].  
Since testing with a manned aeroplane would probably be non-survivable, this has made use 
of  a  rigid  scaled  model  based  upon  the  shape  (and  in  particular  the 3-dimensional  wing 
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shape) of the Gemini Flash 2 alpha aircraft [21] which  was the type involved  in the first 
investigated accident; this model is shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3, Scale model of Mainair Gemini Flash 2 alpha aircraft, used in wind tunnel tests 
 
Photograph courtesy of Oliver Moncrieff 
 
This model,  which  was  1:30  scaled  down  from the  actual  aircraft  and set  with  geometry 
resembling an aircraft with the basebar against the front strut, was rotated in pitch within the 
University of Southampton’s 7’ x 5’ (2.1m x 1.5m) low-speed wind tunnel which is fitted with 
Particle  Image  Velocimetry  (PIV)  equipment.    No  attempt  was  made  to  create  a  self-
sustaining tumble, the subject of interest being the qualitative flow characteristics around the 
aircraft rather than quantitative effects.  The airspeed and rotation rate were varied between 
0.13-0.26m/s and 310-775° /s.  Initial testing with smoke and a video camera showed the 
primary  area  of  interest  being  1  wing  chord  before  and  after  the  rotating  aircraft  in  the 
direction of ambient airflow. Figure 4 below shows the flow at two spanwise stations:- 
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Figure 4, Illustration of flow near
1 the wing root during nose-down tumble rotation 
x (mm)
y
(
m
m
)
100 200
50
100
150
200
 
 
Figure 5, Illustration of flow near the wing tip
2 during nose-down tumble rotation 
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1 10mm outboard of wing root of model 
2 10mm inboard or wing tip on model. 
Airflow 
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It may be seen from these flow visualisations that there is evidence of a significant (nominally 
spanwise) vortex formation occurring near to the wing root, but very little significant effect 
near  the  tip.    Further  investigation  showed  that  the  most  readily  visible  vortex  formation 
occurred at about 1/3 semi-span outboard of the root – partly because of well developed 
vortex shapes, and partly because at stations more inboard, partial blanking of the laser 
occurred due to the trike.  The series of diagrams in Figure 6 (from [20]) ; show the flow 
around this station during a single tumble rotation at 620° /s in a steady airflow of 0.26m/s; 
symbology and orientation are identical to Figure 4, except that the trike diagram and wind 
vector are omitted for clarity. 
 
 
Figure 6, Series of illustrations of flow around aircraft during one tumble cycle.  
(All illustrations in same orientation) 
Common Data Block for Figure 6 
Rotational velocity = 620 ° /s (10.8 rad/s) 
Free stream velocity = 0.26m/s 
Nominally ISA sea-level conditions, ambient air. 
Reynolds number ~1.8x10
-3 (based upon centreline chord and free stream velocity) 
All illustrations within this figure from Moncrieff [20] 
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 Figure 6(a)           Figure 6(b) 
 
The  flow  is  steadiest  when  the  wing  is  in  the  position  shown  in  Figure  6  (a)  which  is 
approximately  135°   nose-down  compared  to  the  level  flight  attitude,  this  provides  a 
convenient starting point from which to analyse the tumble.   
 
Figure  6(b) following  shows  the  major  impact  the  wing  has  on  the freestream flow  as  it 
moves cross stream (inverted compared to the level flight attitude, the trike is to the right of 
the wing in the diagram), resulting vorticity is visible: clockwise at the trailing-edge and anti-
clockwise to leeward of the  leading-edge. 
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Figure 6 (c)          Figure 6 (d) 
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In Figure 6 (c) a vortex forms in the area between the hangpoint and trailing edge but rapidly 
dissipates – as may be seen in Figure 6 (d).  Because of the short life of this vortex, it is 
assumed to have only small effect upon the wing – although it may create briefly an area of 
low pressure below the wing, generate, briefly, a force acting towards the aircraft CG. 
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Figure 6 (e)          Figure 6 (f) 
 
As the wing passes through the condition approximately 90°  nose-up compared to the level 
flight condition, the flow smoothes out as the wing effectively moves downstream, travelling 
at approximately three times the freestream velocity. As the wing begins to pitch up into the 
flow, the flow initially remains attached to the wing (Figure 6(f) ). 
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Figure 6 (g)          Figure 6(h) 
 
Flow separation at the leading-edge takes place at the same time as the formation of a 
trailing-edge clockwise vortex as the aircraft approaches something equivalent to a steep 
climbing attitude. Simultaneously, a smaller vortex in the opposite sense forms above the 
trailing edge. 
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Figure 6 (i)          Figure 6(j) 
 
As the aircraft passes through the level flight attitude, the clockwise vortex has now detached 
itself from the trailing-edge; meanwhile, the anti-clockwise vortex created above the leading 
edge is growing rapidly and appears to move along the upper surface of the aerofoil towards 
the trailing edge as the wing continues its nose-down rotation. 
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Figure 6 (k)          Figure 6(l) 
 
As the aircraft approaches an attitude approximately 90°  nose-down from the level flight 
attitude, the suction force at the trailing edge of the wing is still present as the aerofoil moves 
forward into the free-stream. Figure 6 (l) shows classical von Kármán vortex shedding [22], 
as the inflow sweeps the alternating clockwise and anti-clockwise vortices downstream. 
x (mm)
y
(
m
m
)
50 100 150 200 250
50
100
150
200
3D15
x (mm)
y
(
m
m
)
100 200
50
100
150
200
3D71
 
Figure 6 (m)          Figure 6 (n) 
 
The remains of the vortex shedding are still visible in Figure 6 (m) as the flow becomes 
steadier via Figure 6 (n), returning to smoother flow of the initial image for the rotation, as 
shown in Figure 6 (a). 
 
 
DEMONSTRATING A TUMBLE-RESISTANT AIRCRAFT 
 
Of the four identified tumble entry mechanisms (counting the accident to G-STYX as another 
example of a whip-stall) two are considered to be primarily a pilot training issue and not an 
aircraft  design  and  testing  issue:    those  are  the  failed  aerobatic,  and  flight  through  the 
aircraft’s own wake vortex.  Both are easily avoidable through pilot awareness, without any 
detriment to the role and operation of the aircraft. 
 
The other two entries however: the spiral departure following loss of controlled horizon, and 
the  whip-stall  entry  whilst  again  avoidable  through  pilot  action,  are  related  to  aeroplane 
handling qualities. 
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The spiral departure 
Discussions and comparison of various aircraft characteristics within the microlight industry 
have shown this issue to be a difficult one.  Firstly not all aeroplanes in this class display 
spiral divergence (particularly at lower powers), and also many aircraft which are spirally 
divergent do not purely “roll-off”, but tend to simultaneously pitch nose-down resulting in a 
spiral dive which stabilises at a steep bank angle and high speed, although generally below 
VNE.  This resultant manoeuvre is unpleasant and results in a high rate of descent but is 
unlikely to result in any immediate overstress, and also is easily and immediately recoverable 
once a visual horizon is available – probably with less than 100ft of height loss. 
 
Additionally, the majority of aircraft are spirally convergent at idle power, allowing an aircraft 
which has lost its visual horizon to descend, without substantial risk of a rolling departure, 
until a visual horizon has been restored.  This has been reflected in educational advice given 
to microlight pilots, and as with the advice offered concerning avoidance of the aerobatic and 
wake-vortex entries, the advice presents no operational restriction. 
 
Therefore  conclusions  drawn  have  been  that  although  there  might  be  small  safety 
advantages in an aircraft which is spirally convergent throughout the power envelope, this is 
not readily achievable, and is unlikely to outweigh the constraints that this will place upon the 
designer in his necessary desire to optimise all other aspects of stability and control. 
 
However, it remains important that a pilot who does inadvertently enter cloud must always 
have the ability to descend at idle power until a visual horizon is restored.  Therefore, it is the 
authors’  opinion  that  during  certification  and  developmental  flight  testing  it  must  be 
demonstrated that any weightshift controlled aeroplane must display spiral convergence at 
idle power, at any weight or hangpoint position.   
 
 
Resistance to the whip-stall 
The  remaining  entry  mode  is  the  whip-stall.    Whilst  it  is  possible  to  enter  this  through 
aggressive mishandling of the aeroplane, it is also possible to whip-stall inadvertently.  The 
accident to G-STYX showed this dramatically, but also it is known that in an aircraft with a 
combination of a high power : weight ratio being climbed at a very steep attitude (likely to be 
a speed just above the stall), if there is a sudden loss of power then there is a strong risk of a 
whipstall occurring, particularly if the pilot does not pitch nose-down immediately after power 
failure, so as to avoid the aircraft stalling. 
 
The problem therefore has been to identify means to ensure that should a sudden engine 
failure occur in the climb, this will not result in a whip-stall.  Previous work [2, 3] has shown 
that this is likely to occur at minimum flying weight, and that the steeper the nose-up pitch 
attitude, the greater the risk of a whip-stall leading to a tumble entry.  The critical factor is 
considered to be the proximity of the control bar to the front strut; if the control bar leads the 
front strut during the stall event (even if it strikes the pilot) then there is considered to be no 
substantial  risk  of  a  following  tumble.  If  however,  the  front  strut  leads  the  basebar  – 
potentially leading to contact between the two, then the wing is at risk of rotating about the 
aircraft  CG  (instead  of  the  hangpoint  as  normal)  giving  rise  to  a  risk  of  tumble  entry.  
Between the two, there is an intermediate state where from the pilot’s perspective (the pilot’s 
body  being  stationary  relative  to  the  front  strut)  the  control  bar  appears  to  “float”  –  an 
apparence of neutral longitudinal static stability. 
 
In flight testing various aircraft (most notably the P&M GT450 shown in Figure 7 below, and 
the Air Creation Tanarg), it has become apparent that whilst the critical parameter during the 
climb is pitch attitude, this is not readily measurable – whilst an attitude indicator could be 
fitted this wouldn’t be normally fitted in a private aircraft, and even if it were it is unlikely that 
most pilots would monitor it during (for example) a take-off and initial climb.  The nature of a 
weightshift aircraft is that visual references make identification of attitude visually extremely 
approximate; so, this does not offer any significant potential.  However, at a constant weight, 
there is a direct and approximately linear relationship between pitch attitude and airspeed. 
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Therefore, it has been found during test programmes that the best way to identify the critical 
pitch attitude is to fly a series of simulated sudden engine failures at minimum achievable 
flight weight and maximum power, starting at VH, then reducing speed steadily, each time 
making no nose-down corrective action.  If, even down to closure of the throttle at a very 
small margin above the stall, there is no tendency for the control bar to float or for the front 
strut to lead the control bar, then the aircraft may be considered substantially resistant to 
whip-stalling. 
 
If however a speed is reached where bar float is observed, then this is clearly the slowest 
speed at which a full power climb should be attempted in the aircraft – and it would be 
extremely  wise  for  any  full  power  climb  to  be  performed  no  slower  than  this  speed, 
irrespective of the aircraft’s best climb speed determined by other means.  Clearly reductions 
in power (through operation of the throttle, or ageing of the engine), or increases in weight 
will only serve to reduce the full-power pitch attitude, and thus further reduce the risk of a 
whip-stall.  Whilst in theory one might prepare variable limits, the nature of the aircraft class 
is that a single “minimum climb speed limitation” is sufficient and conservative.  This has 
been accepted for several programmes now and, for example, Figure 8 below is an excerpt 
from the GT450’s limitations placards showing a minimum full-power climb speed of 40 mph 
IAS. 
 
 
Figure 7, P&M Quik GT450 from 2 O'Clock 
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Figure 8, Part of flight limitations placard for P&M Quik GT450 (from [23].) 
 
 
 
 
It is worthy of further note that this class of aircraft has another good reason for mandating a 
minimum  full-power  climb  speed.    In  common  with  most  other  tailless  delta-winged 
aeroplanes, at high angles of attack, these aircraft display very high lateral stability.  There 
have been occasions of loss of control during initial climb-out after take-off where an aircraft 
has been climbed too slowly, several times with resultant ground impact and destruction of 
the aircraft. Therefore the concept and requirement of a minimum climb speed for weightshift 
controlled  microlights  is  not  new,  and  it  may  be  that  there  will  be  occasions  where  the 
avoidance of a whipstall is not the determining factor in setting a minimum full power climb 
speed.   14 
HISTORICAL NOTES – TUMBLE MODE IN RIGID FLYING WINGS 
 
Historical note #1 – the Northrop YB-49 “Flying Wing Bomber” 
 
During the 1940s and 1950s there was a great deal of interest in the development of flying 
wing  aircraft,  particularly  in  the  USA  for  military  purposes.    One  such  aircraft  was  the 
Northrop YB-49 (See Figure 9 below) [24].  Although attributed at that time primarily to inertia 
coupling, there are a number of notable occasions where these aircraft suffered a pitching 
departure from controlled flight.   
 
Figure 9, Northrop YB-49 experimental flying wing bomber. 
 
Photograph courtesy of Northrop Grumman Corporation 
 
The  following  account  is  by  Brig.Gen.  Robert  Cardenas  (MSETP)  working  in  1948  upon 
evaluation of the YB-49 aircraft [25], and describes a pitching loss of control in this aircraft.  
The use of the word “tumble” is that selected by the Gen.Cardenas at the time. 
 
“23 February YB-49 #368 one landing local Muroc-------- 0:35 mins.  
Recommended no intentional stalls due to the fact that during the final phase of the stall 
entry maneuver it lurched over backwards into a tumble. Had to use asymmetric power to 
recover.  Submitted a full report and thankful that the throttles were hanging down from 
the ceiling rather than in a normal position since G forces had my arms locked upwards 
and my rear off the seat. Flight test engineers told me later that I had encountered inertial 
coupling” 
 
“the results of my one Stall Test during which the aircraft had assumed a very high angle of 
attack without a stall warning and then pitched over backwards…. The rotation was severe 
and made it difficult to keep my hands and feet on the controls. The engineers called it a 
lateral roll but I was experiencing a tumble! I was lucky that the designers had put two 
throttles hanging down from the upper surfaces, each connected to four engines.I applied 
full  power  with  the  left  throttle  and  resolved  the  "tumble"  with  asymmetric  power  and 
elevon control.” 
 
The aircraft was subsequently lost on 5 June 1948 whilst flying under the control of Capt. 
Glen Edwards from Muroc Field (later Edwards AFB killing all on board.  Available reports 
indicate that the aircraft lost control in pitch at about 40,000ft[26], with the wingtips detaching 
from the airframe at a high altitude under loading which exceeded 4.8g[27].  The aircraft 
descended almost vertically, impacting inverted, whilst the wingtips were found several miles 
away.  It is interesting to note that this is consistent with microlight tumble accidents, in that   15 
the departure from controlled flight was in pitch, descent was vertical from departure from 
controlled  flight,  and  there  was  structural  failure  of  the  wingtips  before  impact  with  the 
ground.  There are two obvious differences, which is that the aircraft had a CG which was 
within the airframe (rather than below), and that the rotation was nose-up (rather than nose-
down).  However, this only negates the mechanisms previously described for the microlight 
tumble  and  not  the  aerodynamics  of  the  established  tumble;  therefore,  whilst  it  is  not 
reasonable to assume a similar entry mechanism to that shown for a weightshift controlled 
microlight, there is no obvious reason why the aerodynamic characteristics that sustain this 
pitch autorotation are not similar in each case. 
 
It  is  therefore  indicated  that  the  tumble  as  discussed  in  this  section,  and  the  tumble  as 
described in the Pilot’s account when describing loss of control in the Northrop YB-49, may 
well be closely related. 
 
 
Historical Note #2, the Northrop XP-79 “Flying Ram” experimental fighter 
 
A later experimental aircraft, also developed by Northrop, was the XP-79 (Figure 10), which 
was a tailless experimental fighter produced for the USAF.  This aircraft was lost on it’s first 
flight on 12 September 1945.  Very little information is available as to the reason why this 
aircraft was lost; however, it is known that the aircraft suffered a departure from controlled 
flight during which the pilot was subject to sufficient forces that he was unable to abandon 
the cockpit (where he was located in a “prone” position) before ground impact, causing loss 
of both the aircraft and pilot. 
 
Figure 10, Northrop XP-79B "Flying Ram" 
 
Photograph courtesy of Northrop Grumman Corporation 
 
The specific nature of the departure from controlled flight that led to loss of the aircraft is not 
known,  and  it  is  highly  unlikely  now  that  any  new  information  will  become  available.  
However, it is again interesting to note that this is a further departure from controlled flight of 
a tailless delta winged aircraft, where high forces are likely to have been a significant factor.  
This may have been a tumbling departure, similar to that apparently suffered by the YB-49. 
 
 
Historical Note #3, The de Havilland DH108 “Swallow” 
 
The  de  Havilland  DH108  (Figure  11  below,  also  reference  [28])  was  a  British  research 
aircraft of which three examples were built, all in the late 1940s.  The aircraft was a high 
performance  tailless  delta-winged  aeroplane,  designed  specifically  for  research  into  the 
control of flying-wing aeroplanes, and into the transonic flight regime.  All three of these 
aircraft were lost in fatal flight testing accidents. 
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Figure 11, de Havilland DH108 Swallow 
Reproduced courtesy of 1000aircraftphotos.com 
 
The  first  of  these  accidents  [29,  30,  31],  which  was  to  aircraft  TG306  occurred  on  27 
September 1946 is well known, having resulted in the death of Geoffrey de Havilland Jr., who 
was Chief Test Pilot of de Havilland at that time.  The aircraft was investigating high speed 
controllability in a dive when the aircraft broke up “following violent divergent instability at 
Mach 0.9”, which is believed to have been in pitch.  Investigation of the wreckage of the 
aircraft which had impacted into soft mud and therefore were able to be inspected (although 
unfortunately the early accident data recorder fitted was destroyed by immersion in the same 
mud) showed that both wings had failed in download.  Therefore there are certain common 
threads here with known tumble departures, specifically:- 
 
- A loss of control in the pitch axis from which recovery could not be effected. 
- Forces acting upon the aircraft which apparently were so great that the pilot was unable to 
successfully abandon the aircraft. 
- A structural failure in the air, which included a download failure of the wings. 
 
 
The second such accident [29] was on 15 February 1950 to aircraft VW120 and was during a 
sortie from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough to evaluate longitudinal stability 
and aero-elastic distortion at high Mach numbers.  However, the aircraft did not achieve its 
intended initial test altitude of 38,000ft instead departing from controlled flight at 27,000 ft 
following the onset of divergent longitudinal oscillations.  The aircraft is then reported to have 
descended at a very high rate, before breaking up somewhere between the surface and 
10,000ft.  Whilst it cannot be certain that the tumble was a factor (and contemporary reports 
indicate that the pilot had most likely lost consciousness due to an oxygen system failure), 
this accident again shows several common factors to those identified as part of the tumble, 
specifically:- 
 
- A departure in pitch from controlled flight. 
- A very rapid, apparently near-vertical, descent. 
- A structural failure in the air (note, compared to TG306 the structure of VW120 had been 
strengthened). 
 
It  seems  likely,  therefore,  that  VW120  had  entered  something  similar  to  the  tumble  as 
previously  described.    The  departure  mechanism  from  controlled  flight  was  certainly 
unrelated  to  those  which  affect  weightshift  microlight  aeroplanes,  but  the  aerodynamics 
sustaining the tumble, as described above may reasonably be considered to apply equally to 
this aircraft. 
 
The third accident to the DH108 was on 1 May 1950 to aircraft TG283 also flying from RAE 
Farnborough; however, in this case the aircraft entered an inverted spin, which was identified   17 
and reported by the pilot.  The aircraft spin recovery parachutes failed, as partially did the 
pilot’s personal parachute – resulting in a fatal accident.  However, this is appears unrelated 
to the tumble, and therefore not of interest in the context of this study. 
 
 
Historical Note #4, the BKB-1 
 
Figure 12 below was an experimental tailless swept-wing glider developed in Canada in the 
1950s[32,  33],  which  was  later  developed  in  the  USA  into  a  powered  microlight  aircraft 
known as the Kasperwing.  Both the BKB-1 and the Kasperwing were shown to be able to 
enter  a  manoeuvre  which  was  referred  to  at  the  time  as  a  tumble,  this  was  displayed 
extensively in the USA during the 1960s.  It has been reported that the sustained tumble in 
these aircraft was believed due to “a strong vortex occurring just above the wing” [34]. The 
unique characteristic of the tumble in these aircraft was that it could be entered deliberately, 
and subsequently recovered from. 
 
It is reported [35] that the method used to enter the tumble in this aircraft was to pull the 
aircraft into a vertical climb (effectively the first part of the loop), pause the pitching motion by 
moving the stick forwards with the aircraft pointed vertically upwards, then to pull the stick 
fully backwards (pitching nose-up), and that this would initiate a nose-up pitch autorotation.  
The  pitch  rate  was  recorded  at  approximately  360° /s,  with  the  pilot  experience  positive 
normal accelerations of about 2g.  The pilot of the aircraft reported that it was possible to 
tumble forwards only by moving the CG significantly forwards in the aircraft, and that in this 
instance the pitch rate increased to about 720° /s whilst the acceleration forces upon his body 
became high and disorienting (as well as sufficient to damage the seat structure).  In both 
cases centralisation of the pitch control was reported to recover the aircraft from the tumble 
with minimal height loss. 
 
This  appears  to  be further  evidence  that  a  rigid  tailless  aircraft  is  capable  of  entering  a 
tumble, and also that this motion is rapid and can cause structural damage to the aircraft.  
Commonly with the evidence of the YB-49 it indicates a nose-up tumble as the most readily 
entered mode, and also shows that recovery is possible – in this case symmetrically using 
elevon control. 
 
Figure 12, BKB-1 in flight 
 
Reproduced courtesy of Mr D Webb 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following conclusions and recommendations have been reached through this work so 
far.  These are: 
 
(1) That the tumble mode can occur both in Rogallo-winged and rigid-winged flying wing 
aircraft, although the entry mechanisms apparently vary between them. 
(2) That  in  weightshift  controlled  microlight  aeroplanes,  there  remain  four  identifiable 
entry mechanisms, although it has been shown that structural failure can also lead to 
tumble entry, via an introduction to the whip-stall. 
(3) That the tumble is sustained through formation of a spanwise vortex that forms over 
the leading edge as the aircraft rotates nose-down through the level-flight attitude, 
becoming larger and moving to provide a large area of low pressure above the trailing 
edge. 
(4) That pilot education must remain the primary means of avoiding the failed aerobatic 
and wake vortex entry mechanisms in weightshift controlled microlights. 
(5) That microlight pilots should continue to be taught that, if they have inadvertently 
entered a regime with no visual horizon, the best exit route is to conduct an idle 
power wings-level descent until a horizon is regained. 
(6) To ensure that (5) remains best advice, that all aircraft should demonstrate positive 
spiral stability at idle power, and any weight and hangpoint combination. 
(7) That  when  any  weightshift  controlled  microlight  is  capable  of  showing  a  floating 
control bar following a sudden engine failure in the climb, a minimum full power climb 
speed should be laid down, which is no slower than the speed at which this occurs, 
from a test at maximum power and minimum flying weight.   
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